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Abstract 
In explaining the corporate governance performance of post-socialist companies, this 
article identifies four factors of influence: (1)  pressure from majority shareholders, 
(2)  pressure from outside minority shareholders, (3)  pressure resulting from 
internationalization/ globalization and (4) pressure exerted by the state in the form of 
legal regulation. 
If all four factors have an impact on corporate governance performance, their interaction 
has to be explained. On the basis of research conducted thus far, this article suggests an 
analytical framework for the examination of corporate governance performance of post-
socialist companies. 
Case studies of oil and gas firms from Central and Eastern Europe illustrate how the 
above factors influence a company’s corporate governance performance. 
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Introduction 
This article aims to explain the corporate governance performance of post-socialist 
companies. Corporate governance is defined here in terms of the shareholder approach, 
i.e. it deals exclusively with the relations between a company’s owners and managers. 
In this context, corporate governance describes mechanisms which allow all company 
shareholders fair participation in decision-making and ensure that the management acts 
in the common interest. The basic components of this definition of corporate 
governance are accountability of managers to owners, transparency of the company’s 
financial situation and ownership structure, integration of all relevant shareholders into 
decision-making processes (usually through representation at the company board) and a 
fair distribution of profits among all shareholders (comprising dividend payments as 
well as the absence of manipulations, such as asset stripping or dilution of 
shareholdings, on behalf of a specific group of shareholders). These fundamental 
elements are present in all four major corporate governance models (i.e., the Anglo-
Saxon, German, French and Scandinavian models) commonly identified in the literature 
(La Porta et al. 1998; Baker/ Wallage 2000). As such, they describe the general rules for 
company development and investment in a market economy, whereas their concrete 
design and implementation are influenced by cultural specifics (cf. cultural specifics of 
corporate governance regulation and implementation e.g., Buck/ Shahrim 2005; 
Federowicz 2003). 
Due to these cultural specifics, the corporate governance of post-socialist companies 
deserves separate analysis (cf. Berglöf/ Thadden 2000). While a considerable body of 
literature on the topic exists, the majority of analyses is mostly descriptive (cf. e.g., 
Goldberg/ Desai 1999; Fox/ Heller 2000; Bushev 2001) and focuses only on single 
aspects, such as ownership structure (cf. e.g., Yakovlev 2004a; Krivogorsky 2000; Buck 
et al. 1999; Gray 1996), legal regulations (cf. e.g., Koladkiewicz 2001; Earle et al. 2001; 
Black/ Kraakman 1996), business culture (cf. e.g., Buck/ Shahrim 2005; Roberts 2004; 
Buck 2003; McCarthy/ Puffer 2002) or global factors (cf. e.g., Heinrich 2005; Pappe/ 
Galukhina 2005). A real comparative dimension is therefore still lacking, as is a 
comprehensive analytical framework to explain corporate governance performance in 
post-socialist countries.  
A recent exception is a project conducted jointly by the Institute for Industrial and 
Market Studies at the State University Higher School of Economics (Russia), the Center 
for Comparative Studies (Bulgaria) and Ohio State University (USA), in which a 
comprehensive framework was developed to explain corporate governance 
improvements and applied to Russia and Bulgaria (Institute for Industrial and Market 
Studies et al. 2004). The analytical framework developed in the following section draws 
on their approach. 
A focused comparison is employed to examine aspects of corporate governance and 
establish causal mechanisms. Due to the impossibility of covering all post-socialist 
countries in central and eastern Europe and all sectors of any one national economy, the 
authors have opted to pursue a focused comparison of three countries (Poland, Russia 
and Ukraine) in the oil and gas sector. Focused comparisons fall between case studies 
and statistical analysis. They are small N studies concentrating on the intensive 
comparison of a specific aspect in a small number of countries. This research design 
seems especially suitable when sufficient reliable data for large N studies are not yet 
available, as is the case of post-socialist countries. The focused comparison will deliver 
the data and background information on causal mechanisms for the quantitative 
research. Therefore, focused comparisons and large-scale samplings are not competitive 
but complementary (Gerring 2004).   3
Development of an analytical framework 
Under the socialist system, corporate governance in the sense of the shareholder 
approach was a nonentity, as all large companies were state-owned and -controlled. 
Accordingly, there were no corporate governance regulations in place when the socialist 
system disappeared, nor were there state agencies capable of controlling private 
companies.  
The newly established corporate governance institutions in the three countries examined 
here were strongly influenced by the German corporate governance model. Companies 
in Poland, Russia and Ukraine have a two-tier board system despite a strong US 
influence (especially in Russia) during the process of institution building; this model 
better fits their ownership structure. Contrary to the Anglo-American configuration, 
where companies owned by a large group of small private shareholders dominate, 
ownership structures in post-socialist economies are characterized by large 
blockholders. 
At the beginning of this decade up to 65% of all Russian companies were more than 
50% owned by one shareholder. The average share of the largest shareholder was 
approximately 40% (Dolgopyatova 2003; Radygin et al. 2004). In Poland today, 36% of 
listed companies are more than 50% owned by one shareholder and the average share of 
the largest shareholder is 45% (Dzierżanowski/ Tamowicz 2004). In Ukraine, this share 
in privatized companies is also 45% (Akimova/ Schwödiauer 2004). Accordingly, most 
companies have a majority shareholder that monitors and controls the management. 
If we define corporate governance as the way a company behaves towards its owners, 
changes in a company’s corporate governance performance impact first and foremost 
the owners, i.e. shareholders. The distinction between majority and minority 
shareholders is therefore critical. 
The post-socialist institutional environment in the early stage of transformation gave 
company owners – majority shareholders (outsiders) and managers-owners (insiders) 
alike – little incentive to restructure their firms or maximize their value. As long as 
ownership rights were insecure, owners tended to withdrew cash from their enterprises 
through fictitious expenses or outright theft at the expense of minority shareholders, 
instead of reinvesting. Within short time horizons, the owners diverted cash flows to 
offshore accounts and shell corporations, concentrated losses among subsidiaries held 
by outsiders (rather than evenly distributing them between the insider-owned holding 
company and the subsidiaries), and delayed the payment of dividends (Desai/ Goldberg 
2000). 
Even owners interested in the long-term performance of their enterprises did not 
necessarily strive to improve corporate governance. Under the socialist central planning 
system, enterprises externalized business functions to government ministries and other 
organizations. Accordingly, owners had to rectify the enterprises’ lack of resources and 
capacities. In the weak post-socialist institutional environment at the outset of transition 
period, concentration of ownership was a necessary precondition for restructuring 
measures to secure full control over a company, thus enabling the owners to benefit 
from the successful reconstruction and increased competitiveness. To secure this 
control, the owners used informal practices (including violations of shareholders’ rights) 
to increase their stake and to dilute the minority shareholders’ shares. During corporate 
restructuring, the owners again utilized informal methods, such as centralizing the cash 
flows generated by subsidiaries in a holding company, thereby violating the interests of 
the corresponding shareholders. This enabled the owners to bring the various business 
functions under a single controlling mechanism within the administrative framework of 
the firm (Adachi 2006; Yakovlev 2004b, 148-155; Iji 2003).   4
Only when owners with an interest in long-term profitability had (in their own 
assessment) secured property rights in a consolidated enterprise, were they likely to be 
interested in good corporate governance to attract finance and business partners or to 
enter new markets.  
Minority shareholders, on the contrary, have an interest in improved corporate 
governance when they suspect that company management is trying to disadvantage 
them by manipulating corporate information and financial statements. However, outside 
minority shareholders can only translate this interest into improved corporate 
governance when they have the means to put pressure on the company board. In the 
literature on corporate governance, three groups of shareholders are deemed especially 
likely to enforce improvements in corporate governance behavior; financial institutions, 
such as banks or investment funds; strategic investors with a strong minority 
shareholding; and foreign investors, normally outsiders who therefore rely on good 
corporate governance to obtain attractive returns on their investments. In this sense, a 
company’s ownership structure is linked to its corporate governance performance. 
However, this link is by no means absolute. It has been claimed that financial 
institutions in post-socialist countries play no relevant role in corporate governance 
issues, as they are underdeveloped and themselves badly regulated (Estrin/ Wright 
1999; Dittus 1996; Frydman et al. 1996). For Ukraine, an empirical study grimly 
concludes that no ownership structure has succeeded in changing corporate behavior 
there (Estrin/ Rosevear 2003); similar skepticism has been voiced about Russia (Peng et 
al. 2003; Krivogorsky 2000). Contrary to the argument above, in Russia’s case, it is 
asserted that strong outside minority shareholders often lead to the deterioration of 
corporate governance as majority shareholders and management alike, try to oust 
troublemakers by underhanded means. Though ideas about the causal mechanism vary, 
all studies focusing on ownership structure examine the position of outside minority 
shareholders as an explaining variable for a company’s corporate governance 
performance. 
Improvements in corporate governance may also result from cultural learning. In the 
post-socialist cases, where the domestic economies were initially marked by the absence 
of corporate governance regulations, the main source of learning was activity on foreign 
markets characterized by higher corporate governance standards. When a company 
wants to enter a foreign market, it must strive to adapt to the foreign business 
environment, potentially including the adoption of foreign corporate governance 
standards. In other words, the more important foreign markets become to the company, 
i.e. the more the company becomes internationalized
1, the likelier it is to at least partly 
assume foreign corporate governance practices (Pappe/ Galukhina 2005; Heinrich 2005 
and 2004; Walsh/ Whelan 2001). Accordingly, internationalization is another possible 
explaining variable. 
Finally, the state can intervene in corporate governance in order to improve the 
investment climate and fight criminalization of the economy; financial manipulations 
associated with bad corporate governance are usually fraudulent and often used to avoid 
taxes. Accordingly, the state can create legal regulations, which, if enforced, could 
foster good corporate governance. 
                                                 
1 Here internationalization refers solely to a company’s efforts to enter foreign markets and to find 
partners abroad. It does not include co-operation with foreign companies on the domestic market. First, in 
this instance the foreign partner and not the domestic company is forced to engage in cultural learning. 
Second, if the foreign partner acquires a share in the domestic company, this will be covered by the 
ownership structure.   5
In summary, there are four factors which can influence corporate governance 
performance, in the form of pressure exerted by: (1) majority shareholders, (2) outside 
minority shareholders, (3) internationalization/ globalization and (4) the state (via legal 
regulation). 
Case studies 
The four factors influencing corporate governance performance will be illustrated by 
cases studies of major oil companies in post-socialist countries. Russia’s Yukos 
exemplifies the strategic impact of majority shareholders and the effects of 
internationalization. Ukraine’s Ukrnafta illustrates the role minority shareholders can 
play, and Poland’s PKN Orlen demonstrates the effects of legal regulation. All 
companies are listed at the stock exchange. 
For purposes of comparing these companies, corporate governance performance will be 
measured with an index which comprises all relevant aspects according to the 
shareholder approach: (1)  disclosure of financial information; (2)  transparency of 
ownership structure; (3)  management and supervisory board structure; (4)  dividend 
payments; and (5) violations of shareholders’ rights (cf. e.g., Heinrich 2006). An index 
value of –0.5 represents the worst corporate governance possible; the maximum score is 
1.6. The latter indicates a governance level considered normal by western legal 
standards. A detailed description of the index, along with the index values for 15 post-
socialist oil and gas companies, can be found in Heinrich et al. (2005). 
Yukos – Company consolidation and internationalization 
Yukos was founded as a fully state-owned oil company in 1993; its privatization started 
in 1995. In December 1995, the Rosprom-Holding of Bank Menatep, controlled by 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, acquired a 78% share of the company, enabling the bank to 
increase its shareholding to 85% in the following year. The privatization auctions were 
manipulated in favor of Rosprom, leading to repeated allegations of corruption and 
establishing Khodorkovsky as one of Russia’s leading oligarchs (Allan 2002; Pleines 
2000). 
Rosprom over-stretched the financial capacities of Yukos through the acquisition of 
additional assets (including the Russian oil company VNK) and asset stripping. 
Consequently, a serious conflict with minority shareholders in Yukos production 
subsidiaries arose, namely with American investor Kenneth Dart. Low oil prices and the 
Russian financial crisis of 1998 brought the company to the brink of bankruptcy. A 
planned merger with Sibneft, another major Russian oil company, was cancelled.  
In 1997, Bank Menatep pledged a 30% stake of Yukos to procure a loan from Standard 
Bank (South Africa), West Merchant Bank (Germany) and Daiwa Bank (Japan/ UK). 
When the bank was unable to meet its liabilities in the wake of the 1998 financial crisis, 
the Yukos stake was claimed by its creditors. However, shortly after a debt-for-equity 
swap agreement with the lenders was reached, the Yukos supervisory board decided to 
double the company’s share capital, thus diluting the stake to be surrendered to the 
banks. In 1999, Standard Bank acquired the shareholdings of its partner banks. The 
Russian investment bank Troika Dialog alleged the existence of a personal link between 
Standard Bank and Yukos and concluded that Standard Bank was securing internal 
control of Yukos.
2 
                                                 
2 Troika Dialog (1999) Bulletin on Corporate Governance Actions, 23 June and 1 December.   6
The ownership structure of the company remained opaque from 1995 to 2001; only 
nominal shareholders were released, mostly off-shore front companies with unknown 
owners. Only in 2002, when Yukos’ major shareholder, the Group Menatep, disclosed 
its ownership structure did it become public knowledge that Yukos’ president 
Khodorkovsky was its largest shareholder. Though the practice of disclosing only 
nominal shareholders was in line with Russian regulations, it provoked considerable 
criticism from the Russian public and foreign investors due to the impossibility of 
finding the ultimate culprit for the company’s malpractice. 
In the second half of the 1990s, Yukos was characterized by significant violations of 
corporate governance standards. American investor Kenneth Dart was deprived of his 
share in Yukos subsidiary profits through transfer pricing. In addition, minority 
shareholders witnessed the dilution of their stakes through the emission and sale of new 
shares to company insiders. Yukos was also accused of asset stripping via transfer 
pricing and of illegally transferring shares to offshore companies. Yukos was 
indisputably intransparent and discriminated heavily against minority shareholders. 
Upon Bank Menatep’s collapse during the financial crisis, chairman Khodorkovsky 
transformed himself from banker to oil magnate as he turned his attention to re-building 
Yukos. The oil market began to improve, and the post-devaluation environment was 
looking favorable for export-oriented businesses. 1999 became a turning point in the 
company’s history; the company started to adopt a more investor-friendly stance. Major 
elements included the payment of dividends, the publication of financial reports in 
international accounting standards, the election of independent directors to the company 
board and an end to the above-mentioned discrimination against minority investors. 
 
Table 1: Yukos’ economic performance 1997-2004 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Total crude oil 
production (mt) 
35.6 44.6 44.5 49.6 58.1 69.5 80.8 85.7 
Oil exports 
(mt) 
9.1  13.3 17.9 22.4 30.1 35.5 43.0 34.0 
Net sales 
(US$m) 
4,619 2,480 2,110 8,948  10,135  11,373  13,349  22,100 
Net profit 
(US$m) 
171.6  -  1,735  254.2 3,331 4,006 3,065  N/A  N/A 
Note: Due to back claims by the tax administration resulting in long-lasting court proceedings, Yukos 
could not present final financial results for the years 2003 and 2004.  
Sources: Yukos company information. 
 
By the end of 2000, the reduction of corporate debts was almost completed. Yukos was 
also able to secure control over its production subsidiaries that year. The management 
was thereafter able to focus on a long-term business strategy (Mazalov 2000; Reznikov 
2000). In a globalised sector like the oil industry a long-term business strategy nearly 
automatically entails internationalization. Since the Russian government keeps domestic 
energy prices artificially low, the Russian oil and gas industry receives nearly all of its 
profits from exports (Smirnov/ Posvyanskaya 2003). As the sale of oil products directly 
to the end consumer offers considerably higher profits than the sale of unrefined 
products at the border, Yukos soon developed an interest in entering the EU 
downstream market. Yukos saw investments in post-socialist EU candidate countries as 
an entry ticket into the EU downstream market. Major acquisitions included stakes in a   7
Croatian pipeline project, in Lithuania’s premier oil company and in Slovakia’s oil 
pipeline operator (Pleines 2006). 
Creditors started demanding improvements in corporate governance after their 
experience with written-off debts during the Russian financial crisis of 1998. The 
aforementioned improvements helped Yukos to attract foreign finance. Improved 
corporate governance was also a major prerequisite for investments in post-socialist EU 
candidate countries, as governments there suspected Russian companies as possible 
agents of Russian attempts to re-establish Soviet hegemony.  
As a result of substantial corporate governance improvements Yukos became the most 
successful Russian oil company in terms of increase in production and share price. In 
2003, it again announced a merger with Sibneft. However, Khodorkovsky’s subsequent 
attempts to engage in politics in opposition to Russia’s President Vladimir Putin led to 
the destruction of the company by state agencies from 2003 to 2005. Tax claims served 
to confiscate Yukos’ major production unit and charges of economic crimes were used 
to put the company’s leading owners and managers, including Khodorkovsky, in jail 
(Tompson 2005). 
There is a razor-sharp contrast between the company’s egregious corporate governance 
in the 1990s and its adherence to virtually all major corporate governance rules since 
2002. The corresponding values of the corporate governance index are indicated in 
Table 2. This contrast can be explained by a shift in the majority shareholder’s strategy. 
In the second half of the 1990s, Menatep tried to gain control of all Yukos subsidiaries 
and unite them into a vertically-integrated holding structure. To this end, it had to get 
rid of the minority shareholders. The best way to achieve that aim was to deny them 
their share in profits through asset stripping, i.e. through transfer pricing, and to dilute 
their share (Adachi 2006; Iji 2003). 
 
Table 2: Yukos’ corporate governance index 1997-2004 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Index  value  0.4 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.8 1.4 1.4 1.4 
 
Once this aim was achieved, Khodorkovsky, the majority owner cum self-appointed 
manager, developed a long-term business strategy. In the oil industry, such a strategy 
would entail focusing on exports and expansion into export markets. Accordingly, the 
development of a long-term business strategy automatically meant internationalization. 
This reinforced the improvements in corporate governance, as the harrowing experience 
of 1998 had made foreign partners more demanding in terms of corporate governance 
performance (Heinrich 2005). 
Ukrnafta – The power of minority shareholders 
In 1992, the year of Ukrainian independence, the Ukrainian State Property Fund 
initiated the reorganization of the oil and gas sector. After more than one year of 
administrative proceedings, Ukrnafta was established as a national oil and gas company. 
A plan for its privatization was finally agreed upon in January 1995. By summer 1995, 
8.6% of Ukrnafta shares were sold to its workers and 3.4% to Ukrainian citizens. 
However, the progress of the company’s privatization was hampered by parliament’s 
decree, in full disregard of the existing privatization law, that some of Ukrnafta’s 
subsidiaries could not be privatized due to their national importance. However, after 
1996, major stakes in Ukrnafta were sold (Pleines 1998).   8
20% of Ukrnafta shares were sold at stock markets, of which 6% were offered in 
Germany and the United States in the form of American Depository Receipts (ADRs). 
In addition, stakes adding up to 10% were sold to financial investors. Consequently, 
Ukrnafta’s minority shareholders included Alfa Nafta (part of the Russian Alfa Group), 
Privatbank, Ukrsibbank and affiliated companies, such as Copland Industries S.A., 
Watford Petroleum Ukraine, Occidental Management Co. Ltd. and others. The state 
retained an absolute majority of shares in Ukrnafta, which were transferred to the 
national oil and gas holding company Naftohaz Ukrainy. In the late 1990s, the 
management of the effectively state-controlled oil company engaged in asset stripping 
and did not develop any long-term business strategy (Prudka 2001). 
However, by 2001 Privatbank and Ukrsibbank had jointly gained control of 41% of 
Ukrnafta, mainly through companies registered in Cyprus. In 2002-2003, Ukrsibbank 
transferred full control over the stake to Privatbank.
3 Privatbank, controlled by Igor 
Kolomoysky, had become one of the largest holdings in the country in the wake of 
privatization (Maskalevich 2003). As a consolidated and powerful minority shareholder, 
Privatbank demanded an end to asset stripping and a say in the company management. 
It thereby confronted the state, represented through Naftohaz Ukrainy, as majority 
shareholder. 
According to Ukrainian legislation, 60% plus one share must be registered for a general 
shareholder meeting to take place. Privatbank and Ukrsibbank, which gained two of 
eleven seats on the supervisory board at the September 2000 general shareholder 
meeting, seized the opportunity to block subsequent shareholder meetings in order to 
pressure for a total of five seats, which would have meant a veto position on key issues 
(where a 60% quorum is required). Consequently, company operations requiring 
approval at general shareholder meetings, such as the adoption of long-term strategies, 
the creation of joint ventures or dividend payments, could not take place. Accordingly, 
attempts by the new management to develop a long-term business strategy failed. The 
stalemate also prevented any improvements in corporate governance. 
 
Table 3: Ukrnafta’s economic performance 1997-2004 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Oil production 
(mt) 
3.0 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.0 
Gas production 
(bcm) 
2.2 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.6 3.3 3.3 3.4 
Net sales 
(US$m) 
560 538 344 538 486 384 556 822 
Net profit 
(US$m) 
163 57  56 182  182 84 167  254 
Sources: Ukrnafta (www.ukrnafta.com); Dragon Capital (www.dragon-capital.com); InvestGazeta 
(www.investgazeta.ua); MFK Investment Bank (www.mfkgroup.com).  
 
The government’s attempt to resolve the conflict by reducing the legally required 
quorum for a general shareholder meeting from 60% to 50% was rejected by parliament. 
At the extraordinary general meeting of Ukrnafta shareholders in March 2003, an 
agreement was finally reached between the state as majority shareholder and Privatbank 
                                                 
3 Information on the ownership structure is based on information provided by the company 
(www.ukrnafta.com, only available in the Ukrainian version) and by MFK Investment Bank 
(www.mfkgroup.com). 
Field Code Changed
Field Code Changed  9
as minority shareholder with some veto powers. Privatbank received four of eleven 
seats on the supervisory board and its candidate, Ihor Palytsya, was appointed head of 
the management. 
In spring 2005, the new Ukrainian leadership, which saw Privatbank as an ally of the 
former regime, launched legal investigations into its acquisitions in a new attempt to 
neutralize Privatbank’s influence in Ukrnafta. However, the initiative to reduce the 
legally required quorum for a general shareholder meeting from 60% to 50% was again 
rejected by parliament in October 2005. 
 
Table 4: Ukrnafta’s corporate governance index 1997-2004 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Index  value  0.2 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 1.0 1.0 
 
In summary, Ukrnafta was characterized by bad corporate governance in the late 1990s, 
when the largely uncontrolled management engaged in asset stripping. As with Yukos, 
the conflict with minority shareholders did not boost the company’s corporate 
governance performance (or its economic performance). However, in contrast to 
Menatep, the Ukrainian state (as majority owner) did not revert to illegal means to 
remove of the unwanted minority shareholders; it settled for a stalemate instead. 
However, when a compromise was finally reached in 2003, corporate governance 
improved remarkably as transparency measures (primarily intended to prevent asset 
stripping) and fair participation in decision-making (meaning adequate representation at 
the company board) were now being demanded bilaterally to safeguard interests. 
PKN Orlen – The power of laws 
Established in 1999 through the merger of Centrala Produktów Naftowych and 
Petrochemia Plock, PKN Orlen is Poland’s largest oil and petrochemical company. In 
1999 and 2000, 72% of PKN Orlen was sold on the Warsaw Stock Exchange and in the 
form of Global Depository Receipts (GDRs) on the London Stock Exchange. The state 
retained a blocking stake of over 25%. In 2002 and 2003, two bigger minority 
shareholders emerged. The Kulczyk Holding acquired a 5.69% stake and the 
Commercial Union obtained 5.04%.
4  
Consequently, the state remained the largest owner with veto powers, but lacked a 
majority stake. Apart from the stakes of the two smaller minority shareholders, most of 
PKN Orlen’s shares were on free float at stock exchanges. As small portfolio investors 
tend to be passive, the three major stockholders had more voting power than their share 
would suggest. Like the two companies presented above, PKN Orlen was subjected to 
stricter corporate governance rules and controls due to its listing on the stock exchange. 
However, whereas the rules in Russia and Ukraine existed mainly on paper, 
enforcement in Poland was considerably better (Heinrich et al. 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 All ownership figures are from PKN Orlen’s annual reports.   10
Table 5: PKN Orlen’s economic performance 1999-2004 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Total crude oil 
processing (mt) 
12.5 13.1 12.9 12.5 11.7 12.2 
Net  sales  (US$m) 3,347 4,285 4,156 4,540 6,917 7,958 
Net  profit  (US$m)  237.9 207.7  91.8  113.1 266.0 651.9 
Source: PKN Orlen company data. 
 
This difference is clearly demonstrated by PKN Orlen, which became the subject of a 
scandal caused by machinations similar to those observed at Yukos and Ukrnafta. An 
important actor in this scandal, Jan Kulczyk, was the man behind the Kulczyk Holding 
and, according to the mass media, Poland’s most influential businessman. He acquired 
important assets in Poland’s privatization auctions and promoted his business through 
contacts with leading politicians at the regional and national levels (Schoenman 2005; 
Grzeszak 2004). 
When he became a minority shareholder in PKN Orlen, the company was heavily 
shaken by political scandals. In 2004 a parliamentary commission was established to 
examine possible irregularities at the firm. The allegations included donations to 
foundations headed by the Polish president’s wife. Another parliamentary commission 
was set up to investigate allegations that Kulczyk negotiated with the Russian secret 
service to promote Russian business interests in the Polish oil industry. In the Czech 
Republic it was alleged that the prime minister had been bribed to favor PKN in the 
privatization of Unipetrol.  
In 2004, Kulczyk Holding’s president was appointed head of the supervisory board of 
PKN Orlen, although the holding officially controlled less than 6% of the company. 
However, after criticism from the Polish prime minister, he was replaced by the 
government’s candidate after just 20 days in office. Since then the government has used 
its blocking share to hand-pick the head of the company management. In September 
2004, a deputy finance minister was appointed (Heinrich et al. 2005). 
Although scandals have tarnished the company’s image and hampered the realization of 
an ambitious strategy to create a regional, vertically integrated oil company in central 
eastern Europe, PKN Orlen’s corporate governance has been on a consistently high 
level, especially when compared to Yukos and Ukrnafta. The company has published its 
financial information in international accounting standards, disclosed its ownership 
structure and paid dividends. No violations of shareholders’ rights are in evidence. 
Overall, PKN Orlen has been characterized by good corporate governance performance, 
particularly in its disclosure standards, as indicated by the index values in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: PKN Orlen’s corporate governance index 1999-2004 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Index  value  1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.4 
 
This can be seen as a result of a stricter enforcement of legal regulations related to 
corporate governance (Hashi 2003), forcing the company to ensure a high level of 
transparency in financial reporting and ownership disclosure (Brody et al. 2005; Patel et 
al. 2002). This moreover prompted state organs to investigate allegations of 
manipulations and violations. Though the parliamentary committees established to 
examine PKN Orlen are unlikely to clarify all issues, public attention and pressure helps   11
to ensure certain minimum standards of conduct for politicians and businesspeople alike 
(Federowicz/ Sitek 2006). 
Conclusion 
Earlier, we singled out four factors influencing corporate governance performance. As 
there is no single explaining factor for corporate governance performance, but rather a 
combination, a more complex framework is necessary to explain it. On the basis of 
research conducted so far (Heinrich et al. 2005), the following analytical framework is 
suggested: 
In the socialist system, corporate governance did not exist in the western sense; all large 
companies were state-owned and state-controlled. Accordingly, there were no corporate 
governance regulations in place, when the socialist systems disappeared, nor were there 
state agencies capable of controlling private companies. At the same time, 
internationalization was very limited; economic co-operation was largely restricted to 
centrally planned socialist economies within the CMEA (Council of Mutual Economic 
Assistance) trading area. Export activities mostly fell under the stewardship of state 
ministries rather than individual companies.  
Consequently, in the early years of reform, most post-socialist companies were 
characterized by bad corporate governance and a low level of internationalization. In 
Russia and Ukraine, the lack of functioning corporate governance regulations and state 
control clouded most of the 1990s. At the same time corporate governance problems 
hampered the development of domestic companies and limited their business to the 
home market. 
In line with the thesis that as a company becomes more integrated into global markets, it 
increasingly adopts international standards of business conduct and ethics (thereby 
transforming its business behavior), improvement in the corporate governance of central 
and eastern European companies correlates to internationalization. As pressure from 
global partners mount, internationalization leads to improved corporate governance. 
Meanwhile, improved corporate governance promotes internationalization as a company 
attracts more foreigner investors. 
Most central European countries improved their corporate governance in line with their 
internationalization by the mid-1990s. For some major Russian companies, this process 
started after the financial crisis of 1998. 
Although internationalization is the dominant factor explaining improvements in the 
corporate governance of central and eastern European companies in the early 1990s, the 
three other factors which generally influence corporate governance performance came 
into play later.  
Domestic regulation of corporate governance issues and enforcement markedly 
improved in all post-socialist countries. In the central European countries, this was 
demanded or even supervised by the European Union prior to their accession. In Russia 
and Ukraine, important improvements in corporate governance regulation were 
achieved in 2000 to 2002. Further improvements in corporate governance may be due to 
national legislation, such as the adoption of international accounting standards, soon to 
be compulsory in both countries. 
As legal protection of minority shareholders is weak in law and even weaker in practice, 
especially in post-Soviet countries, corporate governance improvements forced through 
by minority shareholders have remained the exception.    12
Instead, the strategy of majority shareholders has had a strong influence on corporate 
governance performance. However, there are intervening variables. Only when they had 
consolidated ownership rights legally and de facto did majority owners embark upon 
long-term business strategies whit the requisite improvements in relations with other 
shareholders, thus leading to improvements in corporate governance. If the strategy of 
majority shareholders is oriented towards long-term profitability, its positive impact on 
corporate governance performance is strengthened if the degree of internalization is 
high. However, if the position of minority shareholders is strong, they may potentially 
neutralize the majority shareholders’ strategy. At the same time, the presence of weak 
minority shareholders has provoked violations at their expense, thus leading to worse 
corporate governance, especially in the late 1990s.  
This leads to the following main working hypotheses: 
(H1) A company’s corporate governance is good if legal regulation is 
good, i.e. the quality of related laws and the degree of their 
enforcement are high. 
Hypothesis H1 describes the situation in the central eastern European countries like 
Poland. The big and established companies, like PKN Orlen, are unlikely to risk legal 
proceedings. Although illegal manipulations naturally take place, they are exceptional. 
Still, there is considerable room for improvement. Whether companies merely fulfil the 
legally required minimum standards or aim higher depends on the other three factors. 
(H2) A company’s corporate governance is good if the strategy of 
majority shareholders is oriented towards long-term profitability and 
there is no conflict with strong minority shareholders. The impact of 
this constellation on corporate governance is strongest when 
internationalization is high. 
Hypothesis H2 describes the situation in former Soviet Union countries like Russia and 
Ukraine. As the minimum standard set by legal regulations is very low (mainly due to 
lack of enforcement) the actual corporate governance performance of companies in 
these countries can differ dramatically. The main explaining factor for these differences 
seems to be the strategy of majority shareholders. In the oil and gas industry a strategy 
of long-term profitability automatically leads to internationalization. Accordingly, there 
is a strong link between strategy and internationalization, which both promote better 
corporate governance.  
As the current experience of Russia demonstrates, a remarkable improvement in 
corporate governance is possible under hypothesis H2 (cf. e.g., Kochetygova et al. 
2004; Judge/ Naumova 2004; Heinrich 2005). However, this improvement depends on 
the will of the majority shareholders, and it can be reversed at any time. Moreover, the 
state has very limited control over these factors and therefore cannot really influence 
corporate governance. As the example of Ukraine indicates, where corporate 
governance performance has not improved, economic growth alone is not enough to 
ensure better corporate governance (Sidenko/ Kuziakiv 2003). 
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